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COMMENTARY

THE ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES:
THE ROLE OF THE ARBITRATOR
Procedural and Substantive Considerations
Ira F. Jaffe, Esq.*
The central premise of this paper is that arbitrators of statutorily
based employment disputes act differently in a number of significant
respects than arbitrators of contractually based employment disputes.
Those differences flow from the following factors:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

the bases of statutory and contractual arbitration models,
the authority of the selecting parties,
the greater responsibility of the arbitrator to ensure that
statutory awards are based on an adequate record and are
in accord with legal precedent,
the types of records traditionally developed in statutory
cases, and
the prospect of review or appeal.

Arbitrators hearing statutory claims must exercise greater activism
and greater independence than is customary in contractual disputes to
competently and properly fulfill their roles. These differences, however, should not mask the fact that labor arbitrators will act significantly

* Mr. Jaffe is a full-time labor arbitrator serving on more than 30 arbitration panels in
the private and public sectors. He is a member of the bars of Virginia, Massachusetts, and
the District of Columbia, lectures frequently on labor arbitration issues, and formerly taught at
the George Washington University Law School as an adjunct professor in the areas of labor
law and labor arbitration. J.D. (with honors), George Washington University Law School,
1977. B.S., Industrial and Labor Relations, Comell University, 1974.
"Arbitration of Statutory Issues: Procedural and Substantive Considerations,- by Ira
Jaffe and Jean McKee, Proceedings of the 45th Annual Meeting of the National Academy of
Arbitrators. Copyright 1993, to be published by the Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.,
Washington DC 20037.
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differently than courts or administrative judges hearing similar issues.
This is true because of labor arbitrators' instincts to promote
informality and to avoid workplace disruptions, because of their respect for the institution of collective bargaining, and because of their
desires for a reasonably speedy resolution of the dispute, for finality,
and for arbitration to provide both a fair adjudication and leave participants with the belief that their claims have been fairly adjudicated.
These theses will be tested by examining five types of statutorily
based employment disputes which are already being arbitrated with
some frequency:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

claims of violation of civil service law in the federal sector,
employee benefit claims arising under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and Section 302
of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA),
discrimination claims arising under federal and state laws,
union fair-share fee disputes, and
claims of violation of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)1

At the outset, a number of disclaimers should be made. This
paper will not review the decades old debate as to whether, when, or
how arbitrators should apply statutory law in the resolution of grievances; for purposes of this paper, the propriety of arbitral application
of statutory law is assumed. Labor arbitrators currently consider external law in several different contexts.
First are purely statutory claims, i.e., cases where the basis of
the claim is wholly statutory in nature and the arbitrator is asked to
decide the statutory issue in dispute. Some statutory claims are presented for arbitral decision by joint agreement between the parties.
More customarily, however, the arbitrator is granted that authority and
responsibility by Congress, a state legislature, or the courts.
Second are claims of contractual breach, where external law is
incorporated by agreement of the parties or where external law is
cited by one or both parties as an aid for the interpretation and application of ambiguous contractual language. Arbitral use of external law
as an aid to interpreting ambiguous contract language is little more
than a specific application of the general contract law principle that,

1.
In addition to those statutes selected for discussion, labor arbitrators frequently are
asked to apply the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
Equal Pay Act, government contract related wage statutes, federal and state veterans' preference laws, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act, and state employment statutes.
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where two constructions of contract language exist, one lawful and
the other unlawful, it is presumed that the parties intended the lawful
course of action, and construction of the agreement consistent with
law is favored. Incorporation of external law into the agreement evidences the parties' joint intention that the claimed violations of external law also violate the agreement and are to be adjudicated and enforced through the grievance and arbitration procedures. Since the
arbitrator is furthering the intent of the parties, there can be no serious objection to arbitral consideration of external law.
Third are cases involving application of external law to resolve a
grievance in an area in which the contract is silent. The propriety of
such arbitral action has been hotly debated over the years,2 but is assumed for purposes of this paper.
Fourth are cases where external law is asserted to conflict with
the clear provisions of the agreement. In these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has confined the arbitrator's proper role to fidelity to the
agreement, leaving to the courts the task of declaring the parties'
mutual agreement invalid. Despite that role, however, arbitrators may
be reluctant to direct an employer or a union to continue conduct
believed to constitute a violation of applicable criminal or civil law.3
As a second disclaimer, this paper assumes that the arbitrator
selected for a statutory claim has the competence to hear that case. It
is also assumed that the parties and/or the appointing agency have selected only competent arbitrators or that unqualified arbitrators will
admit that fact and decline the selection.
The third and final disclaimer is that this paper is based upon
the views of the author - how he handles statutory claims and the
approaches he finds helpful in fulfilling decisional and case-manage-

2. The propriety of such action is for the most part outside the scope of this paper.
For an excellent presentation of divergent views on this subject, see Mittenthal, The Role of
Law in Arbitration in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21sT ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS (Rehnus, ed.,
BNA Books 1968); Meltzer, Ruminations about Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration in THE
ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB AND THE COURTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH ANNUAL MEETING,
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS (Jones, ed., BNA Books 1967); Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB and the Courts in THE ARBITRATOR, TIM NLRB AND THE COURTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS (Jones, ed.,
BNA Books 1967); Scheinholtz and Miscimarra, The Arbitrator as Judge and Jury: Another
Look at Statutory Law in Arbitration, 40 ARB. J. 55 (1985).
3. Such conflicts might include arbitral orders to make contributions to a pension or
welfare trust in violation of Section 302, LMRA; enforcement of a contractual provision
which unlawfully discriminated against women or minorities; or enforcement of a pay practice
which violated the FLSA.
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ment responsibilities - and the reasons for his actions. Conversations
with colleagues reveal that other arbitrators use similar approaches.
However, the author does not intend to portray his methods as norms
of current arbitral practice in these areas.
DIFFERENCES IN PURPOSE BETwEEN CoNTRACTuAL AND
STATUTORY ARBITRATION

Labor arbitration was the creation of the collective bargaining
parties and represented a voluntary alternative to strikes as a means
of resolving workplace grievances. The process placed a premium on
speed, informality, a realistic appreciation of the particular work environment (i.e., the law of the shop), and the avoidance of unnecessary
legal formality. The policy favoring arbitration of contractually based
workplace grievances in the private sector was strong and beyond
question. In that type of decision making, arbitrators serve as an
extension of collective bargaining. Arbitral responsibilities traditionally
have been limited by the parties to interpretation and application of
their collective bargaining agreements. The U.S. Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized that labor arbitrators are vested with the responsibility to apply the parties' agreement and the common law of the
shop, not the law of the land. The Court has stated that arbitration
awards based exclusively upon external law and not upon the collective bargaining agreement will be unenforceable, having been issued in excess of the submission to arbitration.4 Many labor arbitrations are presented by non-attorneys and proceed without briefs, transcripts, and other formalities associated with legal or administrative
hearings.
In recent years, there has been a clear acceleration of the trend
towards governmental regulation of the employment relationship. The
complex network of overlapping employment statutes and regulations
has resulted in significant growth of protections for individual workers
and increased restrictions upon employer actions. Along with this new
layer of regulation, there has been a shift of decisional authority from
employer managers and union business agents to attorneys. Today,
advice is routinely sought for a variety of issues that not many years
ago would have been viewed by managers and union officials as
nonlegal business decisions.

4. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290-91 (1984); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974).
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The labor arbitration process has not been unaffected by these
fundamental changes in the employment relationship. At last year's
Annual Meeting Richard Mittenthal theorized that the increased legalization and formalization of labor arbitration was due in large part to
the influence of market factors and the preference of attorney presenters/selectors. I agree with that hypothesis and suggest that increased
legalization of the employment relationship may also explain in large
measure the preference of the selecting parties for a more formal and
legalistic arbitration process.
Fewer and fewer aspects of the employment relationship depend
exclusively upon voluntarily negotiated contract provisions. The opportunity for disgruntled employees, unions, and employers to obtain
"second bites" at the proverbial apple through litigation is greater
than in the past. This may take the form of (1) an action to overturn
the arbitration award, (2) filing of a Section 301 and breach of the
duty of fair representation action, (3) the pursuit of state statutory or
common law remedies, or (4) the pursuit of federal statutory causes
of action. An approach towards arbitral decision making that culminates in an award which is considered final and discourages collateral
litigation or, if such litigation is filed, maximizes the likelihood that
the award will be granted deference, serves the needs of both collective bargaining parties.
The complex network of overlapping contractual and legal provisions, and the desire that the arbitration process fairly adjudicate
disputes arising in the workplace with reasonable finality, have
changed the attitudes of arbitrators and the parties towards the arbitration process. Resort to litigation is increasingly commonplace in
American society. More and more arbitrators conduct hearings on the
basis of an assumption that the grievant may not fully trust the union
or its representative and is uncertain about the impartiality of an
arbitrator about whom the grievant knows little. The line supervisor,
who was involved in the action leading to the arbitration and who
attends the same hearing, may have similar doubts - i.e., not fully
trusting the employer or its representative to fully represent the
supervisor's interests, and unsure about the impartiality of the arbitrator.
To ensure that the parties leave the arbitration process believing
they have received the fair hearing they are in fact receiving, the
arbitration must avoid a degree of familiarity inconsistent with being
an "arms length" independent decisionmaker and must issue a comprehensive opinion making clear that the record has been carefully
studied, that the parties' contentions have been carefully considered,
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and that the "bottom line" was reached for persuasive reasons. This
approach enhances the finality of arbitration in that it maximizes the
likelihood that the union, the employer, and the grievant will accept
the award as final without resort to further appeal or collateral litigation. In addition, if there is an appeal or collateral litigation, it is
more likely that the award will be deferred to or upheld as the proper
resolution of the dispute.
In statutorily-based employment arbitration, however, the
arbitrator's responsibility is to determine whether the parties have
complied with externally-imposed legal restrictions on decisionmaking
in the workplace. The power of the parties to the dispute is less than
absolute and must bow to contrary requirements of law. In this setting arbitration serves as an alternative to litigation, not to the strike.
This difference in purpose supports greater arbitral activism to ensure
the adequacy of the evidentiary record, to ensure that procedural due
process requirements are satisfied, and to ensure that the dispute is
finally resolved by the arbitrator in accordance with applicable legal
and other precedent.
The Federal Sector
Section 7121 of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Statute (Statute) provides for mandatory arbitration of grievances.
Grievances in the federal sector include, as a matter of both law and
agreement, alleged breaches of the collective bargaining agreement
and alleged violations of applicable law, rule and regulation. Given
the limitations on the scope of bargaining and the extent to which the
employment relationship is governed by laws, rules, and regulations,
an arbitrator hearing federal-sector cases normally must address questions of statutory interpretation and application.
Even where specific contractual provisions govern a particular
subject, the language of the agreement often mirrors language in
applicable law, rule and regulation and adds certain negotiated procedures governing the impact and implementation of those statutory
and/or regulatory provisions.
Unlike the private sector, the Statute contains election of remedies provisions and a built in review process. Section 7121(d) and (e)
provide that employees may appeal adverse actions either to the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB) or to arbitration, but not both.
Similarly, a claim that an employee has been discriminated against or
otherwise has been the victim of a prohibited personnel practice may
be raised under statutory procedures or the grievance procedure, but
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not under both. Section 7116(d) contains an election of remedies
provision in connection with unfair labor practices. Thus, the federal
sector has no deferral concept similar to cases under the NLRA.
Given the responsibility to make determinations regarding
claimed breaches of law, rule and regulation, the limited authority of
the collective bargaining parties,5 the ready availability of free appeals avenues, and the mindset of many participants in the federal
sector labor relations program, it is not surprising that the arbitration
awards are frequently appealed.6
In cases involving adverse actions, the legal status of the arbitration award is similar to that of a final MSPB order, and appeals
ordinarily are filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. Other appeals from arbitration awards generally proceed by filing exceptions with the Federal Labor Relations Authority
(FLRA), an agency with duties and responsibilities under the Statute
similar to those of the NLRB under the NLRA. Upon the timely
filing of exceptions, the FLRA reviews the arbitration award (and
often the opinion as well) to ensure that it is not contrary to law, rule
or regulation. Modification or vacation also may be required on
grounds similar to those applied by federal courts in the private sector.,
Issues which commonly arise in federal sector arbitrations
include the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

challenges to performance evaluations,
discipline and discharge,
denials of promotions, including career ladder promotions,
claims of unlawful discrimination,
details or work assignments belonging to a higher graded
position,

5. Most federal sector parties do not have the authority to bargain over most monetary
items, including wages. This precludes many traditional forms of compromise reached on
private sector grievances. Non-waivable statutory management and other rights and the restricted authority of the participants in the arbitration process also may limit the parties' ability to
negotiate a solution to the grievance.
6. Many arbitrators find distasteful the possibility that their work product will be reviewed by the FLRA or the courts and for that reason, among others, have declined to hear
federal sector cases. We should remember that we earn a living as decisionmakers reviewing
the actions of others for compliance with contractual and legal limitations.
7. The complex procedures for handling appeals of "mixed" cases involving EEO issues
is beyond the scope of this presentation. It is sufficient to note that there are complex appeals procedures involving the MSPB, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), and the courts in such appeals.
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work assignments and management rights,
unfair labor practice claims,
flexitime and work schedules, and
union institutional concerns, including granting or denial
of official time.

On appeal to the FLRA, many cases challenge awards which
arguably substitute the arbitrator's judgment for a management right
conferred by Section 7106 of the Statute. Challenges may also allege
that the arbitrator's remedy is inconsistent with the Back Pay Act.
Although the responsibility of the FLRA is to review the award, and
not the opinion, an award's legality often depends upon the
arbitrator's findings of fact in the opinion.
For example, to be upheld, a back pay award must include subsidiary findings by the arbitrator that "but for" the breach of contract
or law, rule or regulation, the employee would have been treated in a
particular manner (e.g., promoted). The Back Pay Act further provides
for awarding reasonable attorneys' fees "in the interest of justice."
Many FLRA arbitration appeals cases involve arbitration decisions
which fail to appropriately analyze case law surrounding that standard
developed in MSPB, FLRA, and court cases.
The parties in the federal sector approach arbitration differently
than their private sector counterparts; they desire the arbitrator to have
independent familiarity with federal-sector civil service law. With rare
exceptions the parties (including those represented by legal counsel)
have no objection if the arbitrator raises on the record legal questions
(e.g., whether the remedy sought is consistent with the Back Pay Act
or the most recent FLRA precedent) or asks the parties to submit the
current case law on a particular matter. The participants in federalsector arbitration believe that the process is designed to reach accurate, informed, fair judgments
The conduct of the arbitration hearings is quite similar to private
sector cases involving similar issues; however, the principal differences are two-fold:
1. The volume of paper is significantly greater in federal sector
cases; therefore, the arbitrator should request that the parties attempt
to docket in advance of the hearing as much paper as possible.9 This

8. This viewpoint may well be affected by the participants' career choice of service to
the public, by their belief in and familiarity with administrative appeals mechanisms, and by
the fact that federal sector arbitration functions generally as a substitute for more formal

administrative appeals, not as a substitute for the strike.
9.

A suggestion that the prehearing docketing will not waive the right of either party to
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expedites the hearings (which often take more than one day) and
limits surprise. Similarly, arbitrators should insist that parties docket
with their post-hearing briefs copies of all cited authority. This ensures that the arbitrator has ready access to all of cited statutes, regulations, and precedent cases, and reduces unnecessary "string citations" in the briefs.
2. The "common law of the shop" (which the parties expect the
arbitrator to know) is the amalgam of federal civil service laws, rules
and regulations, as well as the realities of the rule-driven federalsector labor-management relationship. The parties generally expect the
arbitrator to apply that legal precedent without regard to the
arbitrator's personal views of the correctness of that statutory and
administrative case law.1"
Arbitration awards in the federal sector are often more comprehensive and legalistic than in the private sector because that type of
award is more responsive to the parties' desires, review by the FLRA
or the courts is more likely, and the issues and contentions are more
complex. A comprehensive opinion furthers the parties' joint interest
in finality since it maximizes the possibility that the litigants will
accept the award as final and minimizes the possibility that the award
will be vacated on appeal for failure to articulate the necessary factual predicates."1
Pension and Benefit Claims Cases
Three types of pension cases are typically adjudicated in arbitration:
1.
2.

claims for withdrawal liability under the 1980
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act
(MBPPAA), amending ERISA,
trustee deadlocks in jointly trusteed LMRA (Taft-Hartley)
Section 302(c)(5) trust funds; and

object on grounds of relevance or materiality to the entry of those documents into the record
may remove a disincentive for the parties to comply with such a request.
10. See Cornelius v. Nutt, 472 U.S. 648 (1985). The Supreme Court held that Congress
intended that arbitrators handling adverse action cases apply the same substantive standards as
the MSPB. The Court reasoned that this would discourage forum shopping.
11. The degree to which arbitrators are expected, by the parties or the courts, to engage
in independent research into FLRA or MSPB administrative and judicial case law is a question about which reasonable arbitrators may disagree. Many arbitrators hearing federal sector
cases, however, do engage in independent research when necessary to reach a lawful and
appropriate result.
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claims for benefits under the terms of pension and welfare benefit plans.

ERISA considerations also may arise in labor arbitrations. When the
parties fail to argue the application of ERISA in these cases, arbitratheir own motion the imtors must consider whether to consider on
t2
pact of ERISA on the matter in dispute.
MEPPAA Withdrawal Liability Claims
The process for litigating withdrawal liability under MEPPAA
combines the federal district court and labor arbitration models.
MEPPAA's dispute resolution process is triggered by the fund's issuance of a demand for withdrawal liability to the employer. As part of
the demand, the fund directs the employer to begin making withdrawal liability payments, usually on the basis of a monthly payment
schedule. The employer may challenge that assessment, but must
make the demanded payments during the course of the challenge and
seek a refund at the conclusion of the arbitral challenge. In short,
MEPPAA provides for a "pay first, challenge later" dispute-resolution
process.
If the employer disputes the assessment, a request for Review
must be filed with the trustees pursuant to Section 4219 of MEPPAA.
Thereafter, under MEPPAA Section 4221, the employer may file for
arbitration. However, the time limits for initiation of arbitration are
relatively brief and continue to run regardless of whether the trustees
respond to the
request for review. MEPPAA contains presumptions of
13
correctness.
Pursuant to Section 4221, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) has promulgated "fair and equitable procedures" for the
conduct of MEPPAA withdrawal liability arbitrations. The PBGC
Regulations provide for pre-hearing discovery patterned on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). In addition, they provide for arbi-

12. Most parties recognize possible ERISA issues related to pension benefits. However,
they often do not recognize ERISA as a broad, preemptive regulation applicable to various
types of welfare plans. Examples might include interpretation and application of severance pay
plans, funded vacation plans, apprenticeship programs, and many types of health and life

insurance disputes.
13. There has been substantial litigation concerning the constitutionality of the presumptions. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held the presumptions unconstitutional
as a denial of procedural due process of law. Teamsters Local 115 Pension Plan v. Yaln &
McDonnell, 787 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986), aft'4 481 U.S. 735 (1987) (the Court was equally

divided).
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tration hearings, written opinions and awards, and the opportunity in
limited circumstances for reconsideration by the arbitrator.
The American Arbitration Association (AAA), in conjunction
with the International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, also has
promulgated rules for the handling of MEPPAA withdrawal liability
claims. These rules closely track the PBGC Regulations and have
been recognized by the PBGC as an approved alternative procedure
for the adjudication of withdrawal liability claims. The AAA Rules
are referenced specifically in many multi-employer pension plans and
plan rules.
MEPPAA cases tend to be complex. A "small" case may well
involve hundreds of thousands of dollars; large cases involve many
millions of dollars. Attorneys are always involved, often several for
each party. Typical legal and factual issues include the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

whether there was a withdrawal,
whether an ongoing labor dispute precludes issuance of
the withdrawal liability determination,
whether the fund applied erroneous actuarial assumptions
in calculating and assessing liability,
sales of businesses, changes in business form, and who is
included in the "control group" of businesses responsible
for the withdrawal liability,
the date of withdrawal,
whether the payment schedule was validly determined, and
issues related to employer bankruptcy and insolvency.

The MEPPAA arbitration scheme is imposed upon the parties by
Congress. Because the time limits for initiating arbitration are relatively brief, arbitration is often demanded prior to the time that the parties know whether they can resolve their dispute without it. In many
cases preliminary discovery must take place before both parties may
make informed litigation assessments as to trial or settlement. As a
consequence, they often hold cases in abeyance for extended periods
pending possible resolution. Unlike judges, arbitrators tend to be
sympathetic to this situation and usually do not press to hear the
matter prior to the time the parties so desire.
The opinions in withdrawal liability arbitrations typically are
lengthy and complex, and differ significantly from those in labor
arbitrations. This is due to several factors. The nature of the issues
often require significant analysis partially in response to the style of
litigation. In addition, MEPPAA arbitration is still a relatively new
process; many decisions, both procedurally and substantively, are
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rulings of first impression. Arbitrators have a greater tendency to
explain an award when novel issues are involved and when judicial
review (provided for in MEPPAA Section 4221) is foreseeable.
Although the parties do an admirable job of resolving issues
prior to arbitration, few cases can be mediated to resolution by the
arbitrator. However, arbitrators can save the parties significant litigation costs and encourage a possible settlement by a number of "case
management" techniques. Chief among those is the severance of one
or more issues for litigation on a preliminary basis, possibly even
through the use of a stipulated record. Once a decision has issued
disposing of one or more major issues, it may become unnecessary to
litigate the remaining issues; they may become moot or be withdrawn.
The parties may also continue to attempt to resolve the matter and
the pendency of unresolved issues may permit greater flexibility in
settlement negotiations.
Resolution of these cases is often affected by concerns about the
trustees' fiduciary responsibilities in agreeing to a settlement which
may be significantly less than the full amount of the claim, and by
fear of a potential collateral attack on the settlement in a law suit
filed by one or more plan participants. Concerns about the initial
ruling becoming a precedent also may influence resolution of the
dispute.
The issues carved out for adjudication in "phase two" of the
dispute often include issues which attack the plan's actuarial assumptions and/or methodology. This litigation usually requires expert witnesses and is often expensive. Although severance of one or more
issues in appropriate cases is advantageous from a case-management
perspective, arbitrators must be cautious to avoid an inappropriate
piecemealing of the litigation.
It is not uncommon for the arbitrator to raise to the parties legal
questions which, by oversight or design, they have not raised. Given
the decisional responsibilities thrust upon the MEPPAA arbitrator by
Congress, as well as the potential fiduciary role of the arbitrator, it is
not merely inappropriate but may actually be dangerous for the arbitrator to adopt a wholly passive approach in these cases, thereby
ignoring perceived problem areas.
Remedy issues often remain even after final adjudication of the
merits of the dispute. If errors are found in the assessment of withdrawal liability, the arbitrator will usually remand the matter to the
fund for a recalculation of the proper assessment amount (if any).
Only if there is a dispute about the validity of the recalculation or the
amount of the refund, do the parties return to the arbitrator for addi-
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tional action. Section 4221 also requires that the arbitration award
provide for an allocation of reasonable attorneys' fees and arbitral
fees.
Inasmuch as the time limits for appeals of arbitration awards to
the district court begin upon the "completion of arbitration proceedings in favor of one of the parties," it often is helpful, when issues
are bifurcated or remedy questions remain, to issue an interim award
and to expressly reconfirm that interim award at the conclusion of the
arbitration to trigger the Section 4221(b)(2) 30 day time limit.
Jointly Administered Plan Trustee Deadlocks
The second type of ERISA arbitration consists of resolving deadlocks among the trustees of jointly administered Taft-Hartley Section
302 trust funds. Typical issues may include selection of professional
personnel servicing a fund (e.g., actuaries, attorneys, accountants, and
administrators), proposed changes in benefits, and other plan design
changes. The degree of formality involved in the presentation of
deadlock cases varies significantly. Because the arbitrator may be
considered a plan fiduciary and is governed by the same substantive
standards of conduct (i.e., to act in the best interests of the plan
participants and beneficiaries when resolving the deadlock), the process requires a significant amount of activism on the part of the
arbitrator serving as an Impartial Umpire under Section 302(c)(5).
It is common for the Parties to provide the Umpire with certain
basic information prior to the scheduled arbitration hearing. This preheating filing has multiple benefits:
1.
2.
3.

14.

It avoids beginning these hearings with arbitral review in
superficial fashion of potentially lengthy documentation.
It minimizes claims of surprise.
It is often helpful, particularly in informal deadlock cases
where the trustees play an active role in the hearing
process, to appreciate prior to the start of the hearing the
stated positions of each trustee group. These positions
may include matters which, from a fiduciary perspective,
cannot be properly considered by the trustees or the arbitrator (e.g., the impact politically of limiting retiree benefits in a local where retired members vote; the business
impact of assessing withdrawal liability against competitors; etc.).'"
See NLRB v. Amax Coal Company, 453 U.S. 322 (1981) for a discussion of how
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The arbitrator is better able to grasp factually intricate
issues with a prior review of the legal documents related
to the plan as well as external information (e.g., the
various written proposals and any cost/impact studies
performed in conjunction with proposals to change benefits).
In many deadlock cases the parties desire a prompt decision. The opportunity to review the documents and to
study the issues prior to the hearing facilitates presentation of legal concerns or questions at the hearing and the
hearing as well as the decisionmaking process.

The types of documents provided by the trustees or requested in
advance by the Umpire may include: 1) the plan itself, 2) the trust
agreement, 3) the summary plan description (SPD), 4) those minutes
which reflect discussion of the substance of the deadlocked motion,
regardless of when those meetings took place, and 5) other relevant
and helpful information. The caption of the dispute or conferences
with counsel prior to the hearing may suggest additional information
which the Umpire may specifically request.
Procedurally, the trustee deadlocks range from extremely informal
meetings (with no attorneys or with a single fund counsel representing both the fund and the trustees collectively) to adversarial proceedings (with union-appointed and employer-appointed groups of trustees
are represented by separate counsel). In any event, the process demands that the arbitrator adopt a fairly activist role. In some cases
activism is dictated because the arbitrator's experience in the benefits
area may exceed that of some or all of the participants.
For example, the arbitrator should not break a deadlock by voting in favor of a motion to amend the plan where the amendment
may be unlawful or where it may endanger the qualified status of the
plan, even if the advocates never raise that contention. Similarly, if
the arbitrator knows of a solution to the problem which appears preferable to the alternatives permitted by the deadlocked motion, the
arbitrator ought to bring this to the Trustees' attention. In some disputes the trustees may recognize that the deadlocked motion was
poorly worded or does not address the underlying problem. As a
result, they may grant the arbitrator broad authority to fashion an
appropriate solution to the problem instead of merely voting in for or
against the deadlocked motion.

the legal role of the trustees in plan administration differs from collective bargaining.
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More commonly, arbitral activism stems from a potential fiduciary obligation. The arbitrator decides questions with wide-ranging
import, potentially affecting the plan's survival; therefore the decision
must be made in an informed and prudent manner. Concern that the
trustees have considered all relevant information to protect them
against a possible fiduciary breach claim also contributes towards an
unusual degree of arbitral activism. In trustee deadlock cases the
arbitrator's function is akin more to an interest dispute than to a
grievance dispute. Since the negotiating parties are expected to consider the impact of external law, the Umpire should similarly do so.
The format of the opinion varies greatly depending upon the
nature of the issues and the stated desires of the trustees. In some
cases, however, the Umpire must issue a detailed opinion to attempt
to minimize the likelihood of a challenge in the courts, alleging that
the award breaches the fiduciary and other obligations imposed by
15
ERISA.
Benefit Plan Claims
Many pension and welfare plan claims procedures and collective
bargaining agreements require arbitration of benefit claims prior to
resort to the courts under ERISA. Benefit claims cases usually involve disputes between the plan and the participant. In such cases,
there often is a mismatch of representation. The plan may be represented by experienced ERISA counsel, but the individual participant
may proceed pro se or may be represented by an attorney who lacks
significant benefits law experience. It is not uncommon for arbitrators
hearing benefit plan claims cases (with the consent of both parties) to
mediate a resolution of the dispute.
If the matter proceeds to decision, however, the opinion must
apply prevailing ERISA concepts if it is to be accorded any deference
upon appeal upon the filing of an ERISA lawsuit. The audience for
the arbitrator's opinion, therefore, includes not only the participant
and the plan, but also potentially a judge who needs to know the
basis, factually and legally, for the holding. An adequate and complete written opinion is particularly important in cases where the
arbitration takes place without a transcript.

15. An action in this regard could conceivably be brought by any of thousands of plan
participants.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

15

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 6
332

Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 10:1

Anti-Discrimination Statutes
The law prohibiting workplace discrimination is in a state of
rapid change. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) will revolutionize workplace customs to a degree not experienced since the
passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Title VII) in 1964.
Arbitrators are already required to consider claims arising under Title
VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), and a variety of state anti-discrimination laws. Government contractors are subject to extensive federal
regulations enforced by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs.
Discrimination claims arise in several contexts. Arbitrators hearing pure contract disputes may be required to resolve claims of discrimination in violation of contractual anti-discrimination provisions.
In just cause cases, claims may be asserted that the grievant was the
victim of disparate treatment for discriminatory reasons or that a
particular form of harassment should excuse or mitigate workplace
conduct. With greater frequency, arbitration cases involve discrimination based on disability of employees with drug, alcohol, and a variety of emotional disorders, as well as claimed physical disabilities and
the obligation of reasonable accommodation. Several developments are
likely to result in significant increases in the arbitration of employment discrimination claims in the near future.
First is the willingness of sexual harassment victims to assert
their claims. Despite Gardner-Denver, permitting independent access
to the courts without exhausting grievance and arbitration processes,
these claims will certainly be raised in the future, either independently
or as evidence that particular disciplinary action was pretextual or
lacking in just cause.' 6
Second is the passage of the ADA. Many workplace practices
are at odds with ADA requirements. Reasonable accommodation may
involve serious conflicts between the rights of disabled and non-disabled employees.17 Regardless of ones views concerning arbitral cognizance of external law, many disputes are likely to involve conflict
between the agreement and the requirements of the ADA.

16. In one recent case, the AAA provided two factfimders, one male and one female, to
investigate and report on a sexual harassment claim.

17. Conflicts will likely arise in the area of job assignment and compensation, among
others.
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8 decidThird is Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation,"
ed by the U. S. Supreme Court in 1991. The Gilmer decision questioned many of the reasons expressed by the Court in Gardner-Denver for refusing to require exhaustion of arbitration under a contractual non-discrimination provision and for permitting de novo resort to
the courts in Title VII cases. One of the following scenarios is likely
to take place in the post-Gilmer period:
1. Gilmer will be merely the first in a series of decisions ultimately overruling Gardner-Denver and imposing upon unions the
responsibility to adjudicate statutory claims in the grievance and arbitration procedure. The Court in Gilmer found arbitral procedures
appropriate for the resolution of statutory claims. Concerns about
arbitral competence were held an insufficient reason for denying arbitration. The fact that remedies in statutory actions might be broader
was found insufficient to waive the obligation to submit those claims
to arbitration.
2. Gilmer will be limited to the securities industry and will not
be extended to union or non-union employment due to the exclusion
in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) for "contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."
3. The Gilmer decision will lead to expansion of arbitration
involving statutory employment claims in the non-union workforce,
where it is required by virtue of individual employment contracts or
binding policy manual provisions. Absent negotiation of a separate
process to resolve individual statutorily based discrimination claims,
arbitration will not be required within the organized workforce, where
the terms and conditions of employment result from collective bargaining and are memorialized in collective bargaining agreements.
Although there is no data to support a secure prediction, sophisticated parties will probably experiment with negotiated statutory dispute resolution mechanisms in the EEO area which represent a hybrid
of the formal litigation and informal arbitration models.19 Some pro-

18. 111 S. CL 1647 (1991).
19. Employers and unions might adopt such systems to obtain somewhat greater control
over the means for resolving workplace discrimination claims than exist under a wholly external statutory system. Additionally, arbitrators hearing such cases, whose background includes
traditional labor arbitration values, presumably would balance the impact of workplace disruptions and the impact on the individual somewhat differently than juries and judges hearing
such matters. Claimants might agree to use such systems due to their relative speed and
informality and the ability to pursue a claim without the cost and burden of retaining private
legal counsel.
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cedures will be negotiated for pre-hearing discovery, probably with
limitations short of full-blown application of the FRCP. The hearing
process will be somewhat formal, with the involvement of legal counsel, but with only limited application of the rules of evidence. The
form of arbitral opinion will be somewhat formal and legalistic, depending on the complexity of the issues, and the scope of remedies
awarded by the arbitrator will be somewhat limited.2" Finally, this
system will be invoked only upon the application of individual employee claimants, and an agreement accompanying its use indicating
that this quick appeals process has been accepted by the employee, as
well as the employer and the union (if one is involved), as a final
and binding determination of the dispute.
In Gardner-Denver,in footnote 21, the Supreme Court set forth
a number of factors which courts were to consider in determining the
weight to accord an arbitration award, including: 1) the existence of
provisions in the collective-bargaining agreement which conform
substantially with Title VII, 2) the degree of procedural fairness in
the arbitral forum, 3) the adequacy of the record with respect to the
issue of discrimination, and 4) the competence of the arbitrator.
Clearly, the likelihood that a reviewing court will grant great
weight to the arbitral opinion and award and that the award may even
persuade the employee not to pursue collateral litigation will depend,
in large measure, upon the degree to which the record adequately
presented the discrimination claim and the degree to which the opin,ion and award of the arbitrator reflect analysis consistent with the
judicial and other precedent developed under the anti-discrimination
statutes. If a significant record is presented on the discrimination
claim, therefore, the parties would be well served by an arbitrator
who employs the statutory burdens of proof and persuasion even if
the parties do not reference the appropriate standards in their presentations. Arbitral decisions must be written with appropriate recognition

20. Interesting questions of deferral would be posed, for instance, if the negotiated private arbitration mechanism limited recovery for certain "compensatory" damages (e.g., those
for pain, suffering, and mental anguish) or prohibited an award of punitive damages. Similarly, if such a procedure resulted in an award which found discrimination and awarded monetary damages, but the damages were less than those recoverable in federal district court, if
the matter were presented in court and access to the courts were found not to have been
waived, would the issue of discrimination itself be subject to a new trial or would any such
trial be limited to the claims for additional damages? Would any such "damages only" trials
be presented to judges only or could plaintiffs demand that they be determined by juries?
The availability of broad "second bite" avenues may deter the creation and use of such alternative systems.
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of the burdens of proof and substantive standards contained in statutory precedent, and arbitrators must be somewhat more activist in
the development of the factual record, to ensure that the grievant's
right to redress against unlawful discrimination is adequately protected
and resolved on the basis of a full and fair record.
Fair Share Fee Cases
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the rights of
members of collective bargaining units to be free from a legal obligation to contribute dues or its monetary equivalent to a labor organization when the monies in question are not sufficiently connected to the
union's collective bargaining responsibilities. In a series of decisions
arising in the public and private sectors, the Supreme Court has differentiated between those activities which are and are not chargeable
to an objecting non-member "fair share fee" payer.
In Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,2 the Supreme Court held
that, in order to survive First Amendment scrutiny, the union bore the
burden of proving that the proportion of dues charged to dissenting
non-members met constitutional requirements, that adequate information supporting the proportionate share was provided to all non-members, and that a procedure was established to ensure "a reasonably
prompt decision by an impartial decisionmaker." The Court rejected
the notion that ordinary judicial remedies allowed the nonmembers to
have their "objections addressed in an expeditious, fair, and objective
manner" and found that ordinary judicial remedies did not provide the
required speed. Thereafter, many unions adopted arbitration procedures for handling challenges to the fees charged to non-members.
The AAA promulgated Rules for Impartial Determination of Union
Fees. Those Rules provide for the appointment of an arbitrator by the
AAA and for the full compensation of the arbitrator by the union. To
a large degree, the rules mirror the AAA Voluntary Labor Arbitration
Rules. The process for handling these cases, however, differs significantly from ordinary labor arbitrations.
First, the emotional level of animosity between the objectors and
the union is often very high. Disputes arise regarding the scheduling
of hearings. The objectors typically prefer that hearings be conducted
outside of working hours, thereby avoiding the loss of pay. The union

21.

475 U.S. 292 (1986).
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typically requests that the hearings be held during normal working
hours.
Second, the objectors may or may not be represented by counsel
and may or may not receive legal assistance (e.g., from the National
Right to Work Committee). Should the arbitrator assist in educating
the objectors (as, for example, by serving upon them copies of the
controlling Supreme Court pronouncements in the area) thereby encouraging them to withdraw clearly non-meritorious challenges?
Third, many unrelated individual claims often are consolidated
for hearing and determination. To whom should notices and information be provided? Is personal notice required if there are several
hundred objectors in a consolidated state-wide proceeding? Arbitral
assistance to designate one or more members as representatives of the
objector class for purposes of notice and to have a central location to
docket information (e.g., the AAA office) will expedite the hearing
process.
Fourth, a number of states have enacted fair share fee statutes
containing both substantive and procedural requirements for fair share
fees charged to public employees. Some distinguish between objections based upon religious grounds and those based on other First
Amendment rights.
In addition to the formidable logistical considerations, many
objectors fail to actively pursue their claims. Thus, the arbitrator must
adjudicate "paper" constitutional challenges (which may or may not
have been adequately articulated by the objectors) in the absence of
an effective advocate to challenge the union's submission or to crossexamine the union's witnesses. The question of whether, and to what
degree, the arbitrator has an independent ethical responsibility to
probe the union's submissions is unclear.
To compound the procedural morass, there often are multiple
levels of unions represented at the hearings, each with its own counsel, accountants and experts. The validity of a proportional assessment
by a local union depends upon proof as to the proportion of chargeable expenses at the state and/or national levels since a substantial
portion of the local union expenses often consist of per capita payments to state and national organizations.
If the objectors fail to identify with specificity particular charges
which they dispute, should the arbitrator exclude expense items
deemed chargeable by the union which are clearly not chargeable
under the constitutional case law? Suppose that the objectors raised a
blanket, non-specific challenge to being required to pay any monies
not required by the Constitution and state law and neither the objec-
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tors nor the union cite to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association.' If the chargeability determination and audit were accomplished prior to that decision, is the
arbitrator obligated to apply it and, if so, should the issue of the
impact of Lehnert be raised by the arbitrator at the hearing?
The case law imposes upon the union the burden to establish the
propriety of its chargeability determinations with "reasonable precision." Thus the arbitrator must review reports generally prepared by
certified public accountants specifically for this purpose. The appropriate back up information is also provided and scrutinized. Interesting
questions of privilege may arise as to charges for litigation expenses.
The allocation of salary and benefit expenses may have a major impact on the overall chargeability percentage and may require review
of time records and testimony as to the responsibilities and activities
of the various union employees during the particular year under consideration. The fact that some individuals work for more than one
organization (e.g., the local union and the state and/or national organization) compounds these problems.
To date these cases have been relatively few in number and have
involved predominantly the public sector. Like many other statutory
disputes, these cases require an independent and informed
decisionmaker. The arbitrator cannot assume that the parties will
competently present all of the relevant evidence and controlling statutory and case law. Since complex constitutional issues must be resolved, the arbitrator is responsible for obtaining the required legal
knowledge prior to the hearing or at least prior to completing the
decision.
NLRA Claims
The presentation of NLRA claims in arbitration is not new. The
current Board favors broad deferral of unfair labor practice (ULP)
cases until the completion of the grievance and arbitration processes
even where the issue in arbitration is limited to the claim of contractual breach and the ULP claim will not be presented to the arbitrator
for decision.23

22. 111 S. CL 1950 (1991).
23. In United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 83 (1984), the Board enunciated a
broad policy of deferring the processing of unfair labor practice claims pending exhaustion of
negotiated grievance and arbitration procedures. In Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984),
issued on the same date, the Board clarified its standards in such deferrals, stating that an
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Absent joint agreement to submit the ULP issue for arbitral
resolution, the arbitrator's decisional responsibility is limited to the
issue of contract breach. Sometimes the parties jointly request that the
arbitrator decide the ULP issue as well. Whether or not the request is
made, arbitration of the contract claim may be affected by NLRA
caselaw. For example, the discharge of a union official for participating in an alleged violation of the contractual no-strike clause could
hardly be resolved without considering the criteria set forth in the Supreme Court's Metropolitan Edison24 decision.
If the parties request that the arbitrator resolve the statutory
claim, the conduct of the hearing as well as the opinion and award
may also be affected. Although the hearing is conducted in accordance with the labor arbitration rather than the NLRB model, adoption of different standards for analysis of the NLRA issue or rejection
of the Board's approach as to remedies may result in the Board's
refusal to defer to the arbitral award.25 In NLRA cases arbitrators
must write fuller opinions, analyzing controlling Board and court
decisions, to ensure that the process fairly adjudicates the statutory
claim, is final and binding, and can withstand NLRB review. In cases
involving jurisdictional disputes or questions concerning representation, the need to apply Board law is particularly acute. In jurisdictional dispute cases, Section 10(k) proceedings are often ongoing. Following issuance of the Board's decision, arbitrators may be required to
accord collateral estoppel effect to the Board's findings regarding the
arbitrator would adequately resolve the ULP where the contractual issue is factually parallel
to the ULP issue and the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the ULP. Any differences between contractual and statutory standards would be examined
by the Board and considered in determining whether the award was "clearly repugnant to the
Act" - the standard for deferral enunciated in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080
(1955). In United Technologies the Board also made clear that the party seeking to avoid
deferral had the burden of proving that such action was appropriate, that the arbitration opinion need not be "totally consistent" with Board precedent, and that unless the decision "is
not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act" it would not be deemed "palpably
wrong" and deferral would occur.
24. In Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693 (1983), the Supreme Court held
that absent the existence of a contractual provision which clearly and unequivocally imposed
greater obligations upon union officials and waived their statutory rights to receive non-discriminatory treatment, it was a violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act to discipline a union
official who had participated in an unauthorized work stoppage more severely than rank and
file employees who had engaged in similar conduct.
25. One of the cornerstones of the NLRA is support for the collective bargaining process. The instances in which arbitrators will perceive tension between their responsibilities as
a contractual decision maker and the responsibilities imposed upon all parties by Congress
will be far fewer in NLRA cases than in the case of statutory claims which are based primarily upon protection of the rights of individual employees.
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contractual rights of the respective parties to perform the disputed
work.
CONCLUSION
The role of the arbitrator in resolving statutory disputes differs in
significant ways from that in contract disputes. In the latter case, the
arbitrator has responsibility for enforcing the terms of the parties'
private bargain and is the creature of the collective bargaining process. However, the arbitrator who is required, either by agreement of
the parties or by external mandate, to resolve a question of public
law violation assumes additional decisional and ethical obligations.
These disputes may require the arbitrator to go beyond the traditional
limits of the collective bargaining process. Although labor arbitrators
remain sympathetic to the goals of minimizing disruption in the work
place and protecting the collective bargaining process to a greater
degree than judges or administrative agencies, these sympathies have
clear limits and cannot compromise the obligation to decide statutory
issues fairly and in a manner consistent with applicable legal precedent.
Arbitrators who decide statutory cases preside over processes
more complex and more legally oriented than labor arbitrations involving pure contract disputes. In some statutory arbitrations the
greater degree of legal formalism results from statutory mandate. In
other cases increased formalism is due to the actions both of the parties and of arbitrators, who believe that such formalism enhances the
fairness and finality of the process and makes more manageable the
development of the evidentiary record and the decisionmaking process.
With the delays in court dockets ever more severe, with litigation
costs spiraling out of control, and with the resolution of many employment disputes requiring ever greater specialized legal expertise,
many more statutory employment issues will be arbitrated in both the
union and non-union sectors. The parties may establish innovative
statutory grievance and arbitration procedures, independent of the
traditional collective bargaining models, with different hearing procedures, greater individual employee involvement, and potentially different arbitrators. This will result in better handling of those complex
cases in a more formalistic process without losing the speed and
informality needed for prompt resolution of contractually-based
workplace disputes.
The truly difficult question is not whether the arbitrator needs to
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assume a more legalistic, independent, and activist role, but to what
degree this is appropriate. The resolution of these question depends
upon a variety of factors including, but not limited to, the personal
style of the arbitrator, the degree to which the advocates for the parties have competently presented the relevant factual and legal materials, external directives in the case law, internal directives of the
agreement to arbitrate, and the nature of the particular factual and
legal items in dispute.
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